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I. IHlBODgCTION
This thesis was motivated by a seminar presented to the
Operations Kesearch Curriculum of the Naval Postgraduate
School in August of 1983. The representative of the Joint
Service Small Arms Program (JSSAP) of the Armament Rssearch
and Development Center expressed a need for showing small-
arms as a force multiplier in a combined arms scenario of
modern combat. The perception was that small arms were not
represented in theater-level models used in defense studies.
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that small-arms are
a main tool for controlling combat. A lack of understanding
en xhe correct use and the effects of small-arms is every
tit as detrimental en todays modern battlefield as it was
in past wars, perhaps even more so with the devistating
conseguences awaiting one who makes mistakes when his adver-
sary has the advanced weapons systems of today.
With an increased use cf modern computers to simulate
combat for defense studies, it is imperative that one under-
stand all of the complexities of the combat he is trying to
simulate. Defense acquisition is relying more and more on
computer aids for weapons procurement. One had better be
aware cf any assumptions or drawbacks of a computer aided
decision before making a decision on where to put emphasis
in what weapons are neeeded.
The initial intent of this thesis was to provide a
concrete analysis on the value of small-arms as a force
multiplier represented in aggregated-f orce models.
(Small-arms, as used in this thesis, is a general term used
to denote weapons cf a pistol, rifle, or machine gun
nature.) There are two interelated problems in determining
the relative worth of small-arms in a combined-arms
8

scenario: 1) what is the contribution of small-arms to
modern combat (and hew does one go about quantifying it)?
and 2) in light of (1) , how does one go about representing
the effects of small-arms in combat models in general and
large-scale aggregated-force models in particular?
Weapons, weapon systems, tactics, and war itself have
undergone continual evolution since the dawn of time. The
analysis en the use of weapons in combat took a dramatic
change in the early 1960' s with the introduction of the
scientific irethod to evaluate defense policy and planning.
With weapon systems becoming increasingly complex and
budgetary censiderations taking a front row seat. Secretary
cf Defense McNamara instituted the "Modern Design for
Defense Decision." His remarks indicated a need to evaluate
the overall goal and capability of the whole defense posture
cf the United States and then break this down into the
individual contributions of different units and weapon
systems with a keen eye on effectiveness per dollar.
[Ref. 1: p. 32]
This basis has prompted a large number of models to be
the foundation for quantitative studies. The Department of
Defense estimates an annual cost of about a quarter of a
billicn dollars on quantitative studies with thirty to forty
million alone for new models [Bef. 2].
The Soviets alsc have a deep interest in the use of
combat mcdels for military studies. They consider combined
arms comhat to be the operation of a system composed of
subunits of the combined arms team. Through this medium the
Soviets are attempting to model the complexities of combat
in a realistic manner. [Bef. 3]
Table I depicts a general outline of the use of quanti-
tative studies in the Soviet Onion. [Ref. 4]
The Soviet Union has used operations research techniques
to study virtually all aspects of combat. A leading topic in

TABLE I
SOVIET OSES OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
1. Off-line Support cf Weapons-System Acquisition
Process
- Design of new weapons systems
- Development of "optimal" tactics for new
weapons systems
- Development of "optimal" countermeasures
against new enemy weapons systems
2. On-Line Support cf Combat Operations (Automated
Irccp Control)
Soviet studies is that of modelling what they term troop
control. Their trccp control closely parallels what is
referred tc as command and control in the United States. We
are also very interested in the modelling of the command and
contrcl processes. [Bef. 5: p. 313]
Modelling the ccmmand and control function of defense
forces is a process that models combat at the largest of
scales. Smaller submodels are needed to drive the larger
command and control processes. Command and control can be
described as the process which allocates resources. Command
is the term used by military authority to allocate or real-
locate assigned resources. Control, on the other hand, is
the process by which that allocation takes place. [Ref. 6:
p.
5
] Figure 1.1 is an illustration of a simple command and
contrcl process. ( Ref . 7]
A methodology for identifying deficiencies and alterna-
tive soluticns in the command and control process involves
the need for assessment of current and projectsd capability
and reflects the projected growth in the appropriate threat
[Ref, 6: p. 11]. Chapter III explores the processes of
combat that must be modelled to accurately assess the capa-
bility of one force against another. These processes are








Figure 1.1 THE COHMAHD AND CONTROL PROCESS.
JSSAP's impressions that combat models are not truly
representative of the interaction of small-arms in comfcat
are by no means unique. In its report to Congress the
Government Accounting Office states:
It should be apparent that if attrition and the syner-
gistic effects or lower level combat were truly under-
stood, there would not be such a disparity in the
modelling of theater- level attriton. Conversely, to the
extent that these things are not well understood— the
analytical basis for assessing weapon system effective-
ness appears to warrant continuing attention [Ref. 1:
p. 148].
Dr. F.B. Kapper, the former Scientific and Technical




The phencmonology of combat, as far as I'm concerned, is
not as well, understood as it needs to be. In all honesty
I dcn't think we fully understand the interaction of
combined arms. Take a typical ground force situation,
with one guy looking at it. Now someone introduces allkinds cf air/ground interdiction and then it gets some-
what complex. Then someone puts in some tactical
nuclear or chemical munitions and that really creates
complexities that I really don't think we understand. I
think we should try to look at the basic phenomena and
try to get a better handle on the essentials. I don't
think we do enough in this regard [Eef. 8].
After some initial research, it became apparent the
solution of the problems pointed out in the above guctes and
the problem mentioned earlier of quantifying the contribu-
tion of small-arms to modern combat was well beyond the
scope of this thesis. With very little in the way of
published research en the dynamics of combat and its
modelling available, a concrete solution on the value of
small-arms tecame even harder. By exploring the basics of
attrition in combat models and reviewing the main uses of
small-arms in combat, it is the intention of the thesis to
present a framework for inferring how the contribution of
small-arms to modern combat is implicitly represented for
current iodels.
Chapter II will investigate the current need for small-
arms en the modern battlefield. With the missions of
small-arms as a foundation, methods of combat modelling will
be reviewed to see why the effects of small-arms are not
fully represented. Chapter III will present an overview of
model types. This background is important for understanding
how and why models are developed and what their purpose is.
Chapter IV explores the basics of attrition modelling. While
small-arms play only a small role in direct attrition, they
are responsible for ether larger weapons systems being able
to achieve kills. Chapter V investigates the attrition
methodegy of IDAGAM, a near current aggregated-f orce model.
Again, small-arms are a small part in direct attrition but
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attrition is the foundation for modelling the ccmra-c
dynamics of movement where the effects of small-arms is most
apparent. The last two chapters bring together these
concepts tc show the importance of small-arms and how this




II- BMEICTHEHT OF SHALL ABHS OH THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
A background on the missions of small-arms is important
for understanding that their major effects are not in the
actual attrition or killing of the enemy but in how they are
used to control the tattle. Small-arms are at the very heart
cf combat yet their vital effects are sometimes overshadowed
by the larger weapons sytems. This chapter, based on experi-
ences at the Naticnal Training Center at Ft. Irwin
California, will show how small-arms are vital to making the
larger weapons systems as valuable as they are.
It is a common and also intuitively obvious assertion
that the tank is the most 'valuable 1 weapon system in the
ground battle. What is not quite as commonly known or
remembered is that the tank is a part of a combined arms
team, supporting the infantry, whose mission is to "Locate,
Close With, and Destroy the Enemy by Fire and Maneuver."
Tanks by themselves are of minimum value in a battle.
Tanks, in conjunction with a balanced combinad arms team of
infantry, artillery, aircraft, and possibly naval gunfire,
have a very high value.
There is still a tendency in each separate unit... to be
a cne-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman
wants to shoot, tfce tanker to charge. the artilleryman
to fire... that is not the way to win battles.
-MG George S. Patten
The concept of a combined arms team is that the value of
the team is greater than the sum of the individual compo-
nents. The value cf small arms must be thought cf in a
slightly different manner than tanks or artillery as small
arms are inherent to every fighting unit, not just the
14

infantry- The use cf small arms as a tool for maintaining
contact with the enemy in a close comoat situation has not
changed since the invention of black powder- Despite the
increased range and lethality of modern weapons, the final
stages cf combat are still those of "eye to eye." The
attacker's mission is still to eventually stand on The
ground that the defender is currently on and doesn't intend
on moving from. Other uses for small arms are created and
evolve with the invention and evolution of other weapons
systems and tactics.
Table II gives the main uses of small arms en the modern
battlefield. This table was developed after interviewing
mechanized infantry company commanders and evaluations from
the National Training Center (NTC) , reviewing the Army's
Command and Staff College's observations on the NTC exer-
cises, and the author's personal experiences as a Marine and
instructor at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Ft
Sill, Oklahoma. Table II is not intended as an all inclu-
sive list cf uses of small arms. The intent is to give the
reader a feel for the interaction of small arms and an intu-
itive grasp of their value in a combined arms battle.
TABLE II
MAIN OSES OF SHALL ABBS
1. MAINTAINING CONTACT /CLOSE COMBAT
2. DENY ACCESS TC TERRAIN
3. EREAK OP/ISOLATE OPPOSING FORCES AND VEHICLES
4. PREVENT DISMCDNTED INEANTRY FROM CLEARING
CESTACLES





Ncte that for points in Table II, the uses of small-arms
all seem to be related to the movement of the overall forces
and net the attrition of individual soldiers or weapons.
The remainder of the chapter will discuss the dynamics of
how small-arms accomplishes the tasks enumerated in Table II
A. S1BATEGI OF COHBAT
Ficm the American perspective, Soviet doctrine for
warfare in Europe is that of a rapid advance. Their offen-
sive actions intend on bypassing strongpoints or a quick
breakthrough if that is impossible. Their plans utilize an
echelcr concept for follow-on units to clean up strongholds.
Through proper employment of front line units and well-
placed obstacles protected by small arms fire, the NATO
defense is to channelize their advance, break up their
echelons, and isolate units from the main force. [Bef. 9]
The National Training Center (NTC) at Ft Irwin,
Calif crria conducts live-fire combined-arms exercises
throughout the year. NTC utilizes videotape and constant
position locating equipment along with the Multiple
Integrated Laser Evaluation System (MILES) for determining
kills. The Center is not capable of assessing kills due to
small arms but they do play a role in the exercises.
Cbstacles are a key to slowing down and channelizing an
attacking force. Wten obstacles are encountered, infantry
are required to dismount and clear them. Machine gun and
rifle fire prevent the clearing, or at least slow it down.
Consider a situation in which a tank or personnel carrier
encounters an obstacle. If the defender is properly
employed, the vehicle will be taking fire. The obstacle must
be moved or the vehicle will be destroyed. Infantry dismount
and attempt to clear the obstacle under the direction of the
vehicle commander who is competing with rifle fire directed
16

at the infantry for the attention of the man. If a large
machine gun is penetrating the carrier, the command and
control of the unit is disrupted. What has more impact; a
sergeant or .50 caliber jacketed slugs tearing holes through
a few inches of alluminum surrounding one? The extra time
in the obstacles, brought about through small arms fire,
increases the probability of kill for larger weapons due to
more acquisition time and time for more rounds to be fired.
On the other side of the coin, small arms bring abcut
protection from antitank guided missiles. If an antitank
weapon has a certain probabilty of kill in a non-opposed
situation, that probability is certainly degraded by
suppression from small arms fire, even if a kill of the
weapon is not achieved. * Infantry and small-arms drive cut
individuals with antitank (AT) weapons. Regardless of
whether or not the weapon is destroyed, the unit moving
against the AT weapons is able to move faster and further
than if the AT weapons were at their full effectiveness.
A heavy combat unit, such as a tank company in the
defense, can be destroyed by a numerically smaller force of
antitank weapons if the tank company does not properly
employ its organic small arms in a viable security plan.
There is sometimes a tendency in armor and artillery units
to go lax en security measures and the result is that a
small, lightly armed opposing force is able to destroy or
highly degrade them. z
»These conclusions and observations were drawn from
conversations with LTC. J. C. Crowley of the Trends section
of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. See
appendix A for a complete view of how small arms and
infantry are integrated into the combined arms team at the
Nationax Training Center.
2 These observations are taken from conversations with
Captain E. Hirlinger, an Armor Task Force
Observer-Controller at the National Training Center, Ft
Irwin, California. See appendix A for further discussion.
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eArtillery units rot only need good security while actu-
ally delivering fires, but during movement to other posi-
tions. The invention of counter battery radar forced a
doctrinal change on the artillery of reguiring several moves
a day. During these moves the artillery pieces are o
little value bur they are highly vulnerable to attack from
light infantry units. Their only means of surviving to use
their high combat value is through effective use of organic
small -arms.
An artillery weapons system is composed of three parts;
the hcwitzers themselves, a fire direction center, and seme
means of observing and directing the fires, normally a
foward observer. The foward observer is employed with the
front lire units to locate and adjust fires on targets. He
relies en small arms for his survival. Even if he never
engages an enemy with his personal weapon, his bold and
agressive surveilance of the battlefield would be hampered
if he did net have the means to protect himself. Likewise,
an enemy would be more aggressive in his actions to take out
the observer if he was aware that the observer was inade-
guately protected. Psychology plays a big role here. Who
would be more apt to confidently adjust artillery fires or
call in air strikes in a hostile jungle environment-a
soldier who has a heavy M-14 rifle with limited ammo because
cf its Height or his adversary with an AK-47 capable of
rapid rates of accurate fire? The argument for the long-
range kill capability of the M-14 is valid, the point here
is that the weapon must be the best for the job. Long-range
kills in a jungle are few and far between but the knowledge
that ycur weapon is better suited for the task at hand than
the enemy's is of great importance not only in contact but
in attitude.
Eeconnaisance is a big key in the command and control of
combat units. Where are the enemy strongholds? How many
18

enemy aie there? What types of weapons does the enemy have?
These questions are answered in part by actual manned
patrols. As is the case with the foward observer, these
patrols rely on small-arms for their protection and aggres-
sive actions. The opposition also employs parrels. The key
to insuring a good defensive plan is preventing the enemy
from defeating it through the use of his recennaisance.
Small-arms play the largest role in this counter reconnai-
sance scenario. How close would an enemy infantryman look,
for obstacles if he was aware that his helmet was balanced
on the front post of an opposing rifle? How effective would
he be if the rifle delivered accurate fire on the target?
B. 11LHI OF SHAIL-ABHS TO LABGE UNITS
Based on the above examples, figure 2.1 is an intuitive
approach to the value of the organic small arms in say, an
artillery battery or tank company. Naturally, a unit with
no small arms may easily become the target of light infantry
infiltrators. With no means to protect itself the battery or
company could readily be destroyed or degraded. A unit
with, say twice the table of organization and equipment
(TOE) in small arms normally assigned to it would not gain
much overall value as too many personnel would be required
to man the smaller weapons and manning of the larger weapons
would suffer. More effective small-arms would enable more
weapons to increase the value of a unit without the expense
of added personnel.
C. ESSENCE OF COMBAT
Many good studies have been made on command and control
countermeasures and counter ccuntermeasures (C3CM) , cut they
tend to focus on the technical aspects of jamming and




% TOE Strength in Small-Arms
Figure 2.1 SHAII ABHS IB OVEBALL VALUE OF UNIT.
artillery. One of the primary mission of the Soviet Union's
special forces or "diversionary" troops is that of neutral-
izing command and control centers. These "Spetsnaz" units
are elite, special trained soldiers who infiltrate deep into
the enemy rear areas to disrupt and destroy. The defense
against such actions is for the operators of the command and
contrcl centers to be well trained in the use of small arms
and fcr their commanders to insure that all personnel are
aware that they are soldie rs first and their specialty is in
support of an overall combat action. [Ref. 10]
The effects of snail-arms are not merely to kill infan-
trymen in an infantry on infaDtry battle. The major value
cf small-arms is their integrator, into a tactically sound
plan of a combined-arms team. It doesn't matter who obtains
the kill, the important point is that weapons systems work
together to meet an overall objective of victory with
20

limited friendly casualties. Small-arms are as vital to this
team as tanks, aircraft, or artillery.
21

III. CVEBVIEW OF MODEL TYPES
Knowing why models are developed goes a long way in the
understanding of what one can expect them to do. This short
chapter gives an introduction in this regard and will
prepare the reader for the actual concepts of attrition
modelling presented in the following chaptsrs.
Mcdels are abstractions of reality. They are developed
and used because their idealizations are easier than full-
scale exercises to use in analysis due to far less
complexity. The U.S. Army Models Review Committee defines a
model as "an abstract representation of reality which is
used for the purpose of prediction and to devlop an under-
standing about the real world processes" [Ref. 2: p. 5].
Models are generally classified according to how they
represent reality. Figure 3.1 shows the varying degrees
with which combat representations portray reality. [Ref. 2:
p. 6 ] field exercises, field experiments, and map exercises
are more realistic but they are expensive, hard to control
and take a great deal of preparation to set up. The mere
abstract models on the right can ,be run to give design to or
a basis for a more operationally realistic model towards the
left.
wargames and open simulations use people in the loop to
simulate ccmbat decision processes, whereas closed simula-
tions and analytical models use algorithms to represent
decision processes. Simulations often use pseudo-random
number generators to determine outcomes and are generally
called Mcnte Carlo simulations. Analytic models are mathe-
matical models and are ususally deterministic as opposed to








































































There is some discussion ever the validity of determin-
istic versus stochastic models, but the conceptual method-
ology used in this thesis can be tailored to either type of
approach. Although the models discussed in this thesis will
te of the deterministic analytical type, their outcomes can
te used as submodels of the more realistic simulations and
wargames.
A simulation or wargame has to model many different
aspects cf combat in order to be a valuable tool fcr an
analyst or military commander. Table II lists the major





3. C3 I (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence)
4. Support
Movement of the Foward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)
,
or as it is now called, the Foward Line of Troops (FLOT) , is
a function of many things including terrain tr af ficability
and a fcrce ratio of attacker to defender. The changing
force ratio during combat is a direct function of the attri-
tion process of both forces involved as well as irovement
against each other. This attriton to movement concept is an
important point. As chapter II has pointed out, the value of
small-arms is more in the movement phase but it will be




As mentioned in Chapter I, the process of command and
conticl involves comparing and deciding. This compare and
decide phase compares strengths and weaknesses of both sides
with an appropriate decision on how best to control the
tattle tc an outcome favorable to the friendly side.
It is critical that the attrition process portrays a
combat situation as realistically as possible. Attrition
not only drives movement, but it is also the foundation of
assessment of changing force capability that the commander
relies on in his sense and compare states. The Mitre
Corpcration •s Study on Command and Control Evaluation
concludes with six remarks, two of which are appropriate
here
:
There is a need tc devlop simple analytic models to
descrite the current and projected capability of a mili-
tary fcrce to accomplish its assigned missions. The
model should reflect the general nature and magnitude of
an existirg deficiency.
Models could be useful in structuring/focussing the
resource allocation debate in the Services and at high
?overnment levels. These models could identify irforma-
ion needs and determine contributions of proposed
programs to mission accomplishment. [Ref. 6: p. 66]
In a simulation, as in the real world, the commander
needs feedback on his decisions. The assessment routines
that rely en attrition are of paramount importance to a
reallistic model. Attrition is only part of the overall
combat process. But the need for the analys-c of the wargame
or simulation to understand the capabilities and drawbacks
cf the attrition processes used in his model cannot be
over stressed.
The next chapter deals with different attrition
aproaches used, starting with a simple Lanchester equation
cf ccmbat. Conceptually it would be ideal to represent
combat at the item to item level. This would involve
portraying the results of one on one ccmbat for each and
25

every possible combination of friendly to enemy weapons
engagements for all weapons available to either side. This
weald become very complex and somewhere along the way
aggregation of forces becomes necessary. Aggregation yields
an "overall combat effectiveness" of the force that is
needed, if not for the model itself, for the commander's
sensing and comparing of his capabilities against that of




I¥, MODELING TEE FOBCE-OH-FORCE ATTRITION PROCESS
Attrition modelling, or casualty assessment of seme sort
is one of the foundation processes of all combat models. By
examination of these processes, one will ba able to under-
stand how the effects of small-arms discussed earlier are
implied rather than openly used in the attrition processes.
There are basically three approaches to casualty assessment:
a Mcnte Carlo simulation, the firepower score, cr a
Lanchester-type model. Monte Carlo simulations are gener-
ally used fcr battalicn-sized units and smaller engagements
and hence will not be discussed further in this thesis. The
firepower score approach is used in modelling theater-level
combat and will be addressed in the second half of this
chapter and in chapter V. Lanchester-type models have been
developed in the United States for the full spectrum of
combat from small units to theater level. [Ref. 2: p. 12]
1. DETAILED LAHCHESIEB-TYPE HODELS
Frederick W. Lanchester f s purpose in 1914 was to provide
insight into the dynamics of combat under "modern conditons"
and tc justify the principle of concentration. His basic
eguations have been the foundation for virtually all differ-
ential eguation approaches to combat modelling. Figure 4.1
depicts the basic Lacchester paradigm. [Ref. 12]
1 . The Fundamental Lan chester-Type Att rition Paradigm
The combat in figure 4.1 is between two homogeneous
forces: a homogeneous X force (for example, tanks) opposed
by a homogeneous I force (for example, anti-tank weapons).
Lanchester's equation for modern warfare assumes that the
27

Figure 4.1 LANCHESTER COMBAT.
casualty rate of such a homogeneous force is directly
propcrticnal to the number of enemy firers. For example, the
X force casualty rate is given by equation 4. 1 where 'a'
denotes the rate at which a single typical Y firer kills X
targets and is called a Lanchester attriton-rate coeffi-
cient. X (x.) and y (t) denote the numbers of X and Y comba-
tants, respectively, at time t with x (0) = x and y (0) = y .
[Hef. 13: p. 8]
dx/dt = -ay (eqn 4.1)
Equation 4.1 was Lanchester 1 s formulation of "modern
warfare" and is referred to as the "aimed fire" law. The
law of "ancient warfare" or "area fire" depicts the time
rate cf change of the X force as being proportional not only
to the numter of enemy firers, but also to the number of





( egn a. 2)
In both of the above two equations, it is assumed
that fcoth the X and Y force are greater than zero. That is
to say that the casualty rate is equal to zero if the force
size is equal to zerc.
Ihe casualty rate for the Y force in aimed fire to
complement equation 4.1 is that dy/dt = -bx, where b denotes
the rate at which a single typical X firer kills Y targets.
These constant coefficient Lanchester-type equations for
modern warfare lead to Lanchester's famous "square law" in
equation 4.3. Equation 4.3 yields many important results.
For example, X will win a fight to the finish if and only if
*o/% >Ja/b. The vfab" is known as the "intensity" of combat.
Figure 4.2 graphs the X and Y force levels under modern
combat. [Ref. 14: p. 12]
b($-x) = a(y^-yt (eqn 4.3)
lanchester's work in 1914 was insightful and helped
prove the value of concentration of fire but there were
shortcomings in his original model that needed looking at if
we were to use his formulations today. Table IV lists these
shortcomings. [Ref. 12: p. 9 ]
virtually all of the shortcomings listed in table IV
have teen addressed in some way or another by extensions to
the Lanchester theory; some more adequately than others.
For example, to model supressive effects it would seem easy
enough to degrade or lower the attrition rate coefficient to
reflect degraded fire effectiveness of the firing units.
Onfortunately there is no supportable data on troop behavior




X and Y forces fcr combat modelled by constant-
coefficient Lanchester-t ype equations for
fcr modern warfare. As long as both X and Y>0
,
the fcrce level x (t) is given by equation 4.4
For ttese calculations, a=0.04 x casualties/
minute per y firer and b = 0.04 y casualties/
mincte per x firer.
Figure 4.2 FORCE-IE?EL TRAJECTORIES.
x(t) = X, cosn t - y. Ja/b sinhjab t (eqn 4.4)
Although the U.S. Army Combat Developments
Experimentation Command (CCEC) has conducted many
supression experiments and the U.S. Army has reviewed
the entire topic of fire suppression, the representation
of suppressive effects in casualty-assessment models




SHORTCOMINGS OF ORIGINAL MODELS
1. COEFICIENTS CONSTANT OVER TIME (e.g. VARIATION OF WEAPON
SYSTEM CAPABILITY WITH FORCE SEPARATION IGNORED)
2. NO MOVEMENT CF FORCES (e.g. ADVANCE OR RETREAT)
3. HOMOGENEOUS FORCES
4. EATTIE TERMINATION CONDITIONS NOT GIVEN
5. DETERMINISTIC, NCI PROBABILISTIC
6. NC REPLACEMENTS OR WITHDRAWLS
7. TARGET AQDISITION FORCE LEVEL INDEPENDENT
8. EIRE ALLOCATION NOT EXPLICITY CONSIDERED
9. SYMMETRIC
10. NO CONSIDERATION CF NONCOMBAT LOSSES (E.G. DESERTIONS.
SURRENDERS)
11. NC LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
12. NC WAY OF PREDICTING LANCHESTER ATTRITION-RATE COEFFICIENTS
13. SDPRESSIVE EFFECTS OF WEAPONS NOT CONSIDERED
14. EEEECTS OF TERRAIN NOT CONSIDERED
15. SPACIAL VARIAITONS IN FORCES NOT CONSIDERED
Suppressive effects is by no means the only contro-
versial issue with attrition modelling. The very nature of
the attrition coefficents is one topic worth discussion.
Attrition rate coefficents all have a basis in historical
extraction from past combat. Reconstruction of a combat
situation is a difficult thing to do, and often important
items are overlooked, but it is essentially the only means
upon which to start the computations of attrition rate coef-
ficents. Ammo expenditure for a past battle is compared to
the number of kills achieved for that weapon then the scen-
ario is looked at in terms of terrain, visibility, opposing
weapons, and other factors to derive an attrition rate coef-
ficient. These rates are then massaged for how the weapons
cf the past battle are perceived to be different from the
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present sjstems. it is apparent that the concept of
selecting attrition rates is one requiring considerable,
never ending effort. The rest of this half of the chapter
en Lanchester equations will deal with generalized examples
cf extenxiens derived to counter the shortcomings listed in
table IV.
Table V lists different functional forms for attri-
tion rates that have been considered in the Lanchester
combat thecry literature. [Ref. 2: p. 31
]
TABLE 7









b (x -x ) = a (y -y )
Square Law






b/2(x -x) =a(y -y>
Mixed Law
T|T dx/dt=-axdy/dt=-by Peterson (1953)b ln(x /x) =a In (y /y
Logarithmic Law
(F+I) | (F + T)
dx/dt=-ay-Bx
dy/dt=-bx-Ay
Horse and Kimball (1951)(generally very complicated)
Abreviations used to denote the form of Lanchester
attrition under discussion are of the form F|FT where |' is
the dividing line between attacker and defender. The
different combinations normally encountered are depicted in
Table V. The square law and linear law have already been
discussed briefly. The mixed law is a combination of these
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two which can be conceptualized as an ambush-type engage-
ment, in which one side employs aimed fire and the ambushses
use area fire, as they do not know the exact location of the
ambushers. The logarithmic law is normally only used during
the early stages of small-unit engagements, in which the
vulnerability of a force dominates its ability to acquire
enemy targets. (F+T) | (F+T) combat is, simply stated but
very complex in practice, square law attrition between
combatants with operation losses or losses dua to supporting
arms that are themselves not subject to attriton.
2. Hel mbo ld's Extention
Helmbold hypothesized that a much larger force would
fight less efficiently than a smaller opponent and intro-
duced a modification that alters the attrition rate coeffi-
cients based on force ratio. Equation 4.5 and 4.6 show
Helmbcld modifications with a (t) and b (t) being the time
dependent attriton-rate coefficents, and E^ and Ey denoting
the fire effectiveness-modifications that model the ineffi-
ciencies of scale.
dx/dt = -a(t) *Ey (x/y)*y with x(0)=Xo (eqn 4.5)
dy/dt = -b(t) *E% (y/x) *x with y(0)=Yo (eqn 4.6)
Kelmbold stated that his fire-effectiveness-
modification factors should satisfy the following three
requirements: [Bef. 2: p. 37]
(B1) 1 (u) = Ey (u) (i.e. same inefficiencies
of scale for each side,
(B2) E(u) is an increasing function of its argument,
(B3) E(1) = 1
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Helmbold considered the special case where his modi-
fication factors for scale were a power function, i.e.;
E(u)=u with c>0. In the case of constant attrition-rate
coefficients, Helmbcld equations then become equations a.
7
and 4.8. W is refered to as the "Weiss" parameter and
W=1-C. When W= 1, Helmbold reduces to the square law, when
«=1/2, the linear law and when W=0, the result is the loga-
rithmic law. [Ref. 2: p. 39
]
dx/dt = -a*(x/y) y with x(0)=X(7 (eqn 4.7)
dy/dt = -b*(y/x) x with y(0)=Yo (eqn 4.8)
It is valuable to look at the various attrition
equations in terms of small-arms. Small-arms will seldom be
used in the equations directly, their value comes in terms
of how are the various parameters of the equations affected
by small-arms. AT weapons attempt tc kill tanks. How is the
expected time to kill a tank affected when small arms are
shooting at the AT weapon as opposed to when it is not.
Although it is difficult to say numerically the difference,
it is obvious the difference is there.
3 . Det erm ination of Attrition Hate Coe fficients
Two approaches have been used in the United States
for the determination of attrition rate coefficients. They
are;
1) a statistical estimate based on "combat"
data generated ty a detailed Monte Carlo
combat simulation.
2) an analytical submodel of the attrition




The first approach is known as a 'fitted parameter
analytical model 1 since the attrition rate coefficients are
statistically estimated from a Monte Carlo combat simula-
tion. Ihe second approach is known as a freestanding or
•independent analytical model. 1 Basically this second
approach says the attritcn rate coefficent is equal to the
reciprocal of the expected time for an individual firer to
kill a single target, as shown in equation 4.9. [Ref. 2:
p. 47] 3
a = 1/E Vf (eqn 4.9)
Table VI lists the parameters necessary for under-
standing the expected time to kill approach for determining
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficents. [Ref. 2: p. 51] With
the definitions of table VI , the expected time for an indi-
vidual firer to kill an enemy target is shown in equation
4. 10.
Although equation 4.10 is a formidable looking
expression, it does reduce nicely to intuitive appealing
results fcith certain assumptions: 1) If the target acquisi-
tion time is negligible (t =0) , 2) the weapon has a uniform
rate cf fire (tj = tj, =1^ = 1/v) , 3) statistical independence
among cutccmes (p=p(h|h) =p(h|m) = Pssk) , and 4) negligible
time of flight (t =0) , equation 4.10 reduces to equation
4.11 where the single shot kill probability Pssk is given by
Fssk=Fssh*p <k| h) .
This leads to the intuitively appealling result that
the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient is equal to the
firng rate, v, of the weapon times the probability of a
single shot kill by the weapon. [Ref. 2: p. 52]
3 See reference 13: p. 13 9 for justification for using the





fARAMETERS IK EXPECTED TIME TO KILL EQUATION
Factors included in expression for Lanchester attriton-
rate coefficient for single-shot flarkov-dependent-f ire
weapon systems with a geometric distribution for the
cumber cr hits required for a kill.
TIME TO ACQUIRE A TARGET, ta
TIME TO FIRE FIRST ROUND AFTER TARGET ACQUIRED, t,
TIME TO FIRE A ROUND FOLLOWING A HIT, th
TIME 10 FIRE A ROUND FOLLOWING A MISS, t*
TIME CF FLIGHT OF THE PROJECTILE, tf
PROBAEILITY OF HIT ON FI EST ROUND, p
PRCEAEILITY OF A HIT ON A ROUND FOLLOWING A HIT, p(h|h)
PROBAEILITY OF A HIT ON A RCUND FOLLOWING A MISS,
P(h|m)
PROBAEILITY OF DESTROYING A TARGET GIVEN IT IS A HIT,
p(K|H)
(t + t f )
E[T] = t + t, - t, +
'a 1
wh P(K|H)
(t + t ) ( \(eqn *• 10)
,
(
m V ) [1 - P(h h)1
, r , h i h ^+
P(hlm) PlJW) + P( ' h) " pl
E |T^ = 1/(vY PsskiY ) (eqn i4.11)
a = v Pssk (sqn 4. 12)
The assumption of negligible target acquisition is a
gross one for simplification. In reality, target acquisi-
tion time is a very important factor to be considered in
operational models. Two basic approaches are used for
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target acquisition: 1) parallel acquisition, in which a
firer continually searches for targets, even when engaging a
target and 2) serial acquisition, in which one cannot
acquire targets while engaging another target. *
Again, the data for these equations has a historical
base with alterations from testing as possible.
Probabilities of hitting and killing a target are controver-
sial issues under different conditons but it is obvious that
most, all of the factors in the equations are affected indi-
rectly by small-arms fire. The time to acquire the target
is the jcb of the fcward observer discussed in chapter II.
If the observer and the personnel in the artillery position
itself have good security with small-arms one can bet that
the probability of a hit is higher due to factors such as a
tetter target location, more accurate firing data determined
by the fire direction center and a more precise lay of the
howitzer itself by a crew free from the distraction of a
harrassing sniper.
**• Eet ero geneou s Forces
The above mentioned concepts and equations are
formulated for a homogeneous force. The concepts can be
extended to apply to a combined arms scenario more in line
with the operationally pertinent forces of today. For
example, an X force composed of infantry, tanks, artillery,
aircraft, and all the different weapons systems associated
with them, would be more realistic on the modern battle-
field. Figure 4. 3 depicts a schematic of a heterogeneous
force attrition model. [Ref- 13: p. 16]
In examining figure 4.3, the X force has "m" weapon
types and the Y force has "n" weapon types. The subscript i
refers to the X force while the subscript j refers to the Y
See reference 13: pp. 30-73 for a fairly complete look
at the target acquisition process.
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X FORCE (m different
weapon-system types)





Figure 4.3 HOTATIOH FOB HETEROGENEOOS-FORCE COHBAT.
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force. In the double subscripted attriton rates, the first
subscript denotes the target type and the second subscript
denotes the firer. A;j denotes the rate at which a typical Y
firer kills X targets in the oposssing enemy force. With
these definitions, equation 4.13 defines the attritcn rate
for the individual ith weapon system of the X force.
[Eef. 13: p. 14]
dXf/dt =
-2>,-i Y; (egn 4.13)
In a logical extention of homogeneous attriton
rates, the heterogeneous attrition rates A- are given by
equation 3. 14 where T^.y. = the time for a y. firer type to
kill an 2 target type.
A,-. = 1/ E EL
'o M
Ihere are t*c fundamental assumptions behind the
heterogeneous force attrition equations 4.13 and 4.14:
(1) The attrition-rate effects of various different
enemy weapon-system types against a particular
friendly tarcet type are additive,
(2) The loss rate of a particular friendly target
type to each enemy weapon-system rype is
proportional to the number of enemy firers cf
that particular enemy-firer type.'
Although assumption (1) is fairly restrictive (it means that
there is no mutual support among different weapcn-sytem
types, i.e. no synergistic effects), the author does not
know of any U.S. heterogeneous-force model that does not use
it- [Eef. 13: p. 18]
Ihe formulations described above lay the foundations
for detailed Lanchester- type attrition models. The
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equations for heterogeneous forces make for very complicated
differential equations that, for the most part, are impos-
sible to solve explicitly. The state equations and defini-
tions of force posture for victory that were present in
homogeneous forces are no longer possible. The •solution 1
cf the complex attrition equations entails the use of a
discrete time step integration. The time step is used to
multiply the attrition rates and weapon numbers. The
result, the actual attrition fcr that period, is subtracted
from the value of the X and Y forces from the previous step.
Ihe process is continued, with the aid of a high speed
digital computer, until one force is defeated or until a
breakpoint is reached. A breakpoint is a prior determined
point at which cne cf the forces breaks off the engagement
due to reaching a certain minimum in his force strength.
Actual operational models are much more complex than
described here but tte conceptual approach used is valid and
should give the reader an appreciation of the parameters and
methodology used in detailed Lanchester-type combat
attrition.
5 • Development cf Operational Models
Combat is a very complex process that contains many
interactions that are difficult to describe or even under-
stand. The paradigis discussed so far are foundations for
the underlying attrition processes of combat but, by them-
selves, cannot be used to model combat. To develop opera-
tional mcdels, a more complete look at the total of the
combat processes must be considered.
Considerations must be given to operational factors
such as supplies on hand and ammo expenditure rates. The
cverall guality of troops in regards to experience, training
and possible fatigue cr motivational aspects are important.
Rates cf movement in relation to terrain types, weather and
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attrition are important considerations in an operational
model.
It is obvious that the relations discussed above
drive an operational model intc a very complex process that
nust consider relationships between the different factors in
detail. A method used to alleviate some of the complexity
cf operational models is to make certain assumptions abcut
the detail of lower-level combat so more emphasis can be
placed en the relationships of operational factors in the
combat processes. This method involves •aggregating 1 the
weapons cf a force into a larger entity that has the implied
strength cf all weapons composing it.
Unfortunately for small-arms, the processes used to
determine outcomes are based first on attrition and then on
novement. The point is that small-arms affect movement mere
so than attrition. Since small-arms do not play a large roll
in attrition, they are not represented in the movement
phase. Examination of chapter II and appendix A reveals
that small-arms play a vital role in movement directly
though. An attacking force can move through a defended posi-
tion much faster if a successful reconaissance was conducted
and if the AT weapons are suppressed. Small-arms are the
key here.
£. AGGREGATED HODELS
The detailed Lanchester -type equations discussed earlier
model combat in a microscopic manner. The attrition
reflects the internal dynamics of combat on a weapon to
weapon basis. Another approach for modelling attrition ,
commonly called the Firepower Score, is to represent it in a
macroscopic fashion. Rather than model attrition in a
weapon by weapon basis, the value of the weapons systems of
a force are added up to give an overall "combat capability"
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index of a force. This comtat capability is compared to the
capability cf an opposing fores and the act of comtat causes
attrition to the capability index rather than the individual
weapens directly. losses to individual weapons are deter-
mined through some means of disaggregation based on the
overall loss to the capability index.
Whether the comtat model is a detailed Lanchester-t ype
model cr of the Firepower Score approach, "a key observation
is that at some point in modelling, detailed description of
the interactions between physical things ceases and estima-
tion cf relationships based on derived capability measures
begins." [Sef. 15: p.ii]
TABLE VII












M-16, 5.56mm 6,000 1 6,000
MG,
M-60, .30 cal 150 6 900
MG,
M-2, .50 cal 2 50 10 2,500
MORTAR,
M-125, 81mm 50 20 1,000
HOWITZER,
M-1C9 (SP) , 155mm 50 40 2,000
HOWITZER,
M-110, 8" 8 30 2U0
TANK.
M60A2 200 100 20,000
TOT AL FIREPOWER INDEX 32,640
42

Table VII is an example of the Firepower Score approach,
firepower scores are used to denote the relative value of a
specific weapon while a firepower index is the summation of
all fir€pcwer scores of all weapons or the overall strength
cf the tctal force. The firepower score starts out as some
statistical capability of single-round lethality times the
ammunition expenditure rate. Eut varying degrees of subjec-
tivity are involved in the final score given. [Ref. 2:
p.87]
The numbers and scores for the weapons in Table VII are
definitely open for discussion. This is one of the under-
lying arguments to this approach. The main point here is
the concepts not the particular numbers and score.
Whether known as weapons effectiveness index (WEI)
,
weapons unit value (fcUV) , firepower potential (FPP) , or any
ether of a number of names, firepower indices have been used
for at least thirty years by military planners. In
division-level combat and above, firepower indices are used
as a representation of unit strength to compare against an
opposing fcrce*s index to determine outcomes of ccmbat
processes as shown in table VIII. £Bef. 2]
TABLE VIII
USES OF FIREPOWER SCORES
(1) determine engagement outcomes
(2) assess casualties
(3) determine FEEA movement
and (4) determine tactical decisions.
Once the firepower index of a unit is determined, as in
table VII, it is compared to the firepower index of the
opposing force to get an attacker-defender force ratio. The
force in Table VII has a firepower index of 32,640. If an
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attacking enemy were to have a firepower index of 146,880,
then the attacker-defender force ratio (A/D) is 4.5. An
example of the casualty-rate curves used in the Atlas Model
is shewn in figure 4.4. Notice tha different attrition
rates depending on force ratio, type of engagement, and bow
fortified the position. [Ref. 2: p. 97]
The firepower score approach to combat attrition
modelling has received a fair amount of criticism. It is
net as intuitively appealing as a detailed Lanckester-t ype
model, tut it is much easier to use in large level combat.
This easier use is dc to less parameters to input making it
easier tc; build, get data, make computations, and to
analyze results. Chapter V explores the concepts of another
aggregation approach. While eventually this other approach
is a type of firepower score, the methodology used to arrive






















































¥. REPBESEHTATIOH OF ATTRITION IN IDAGAM
Discussion of an operational modal will highlight the
points cf the previous chapters. Small-arms have not lost
any of tfceir value tc the maneuver commander in the combat
situation. They are just appearing to lose it to a modelling
technique that is forced to evaluate combat in an aggregated
fashicn.
The Institute fcr Defense Analysis Ground-Air Model
(IDAGAM) is a deterministic computer model of theater level
conventional comfcat representing two opposing ground and air
forces. IDAGAM was initially produced for use by the
Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency, Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (SAGA,OJCS). The model was the prin-
ciple model used by SAGA in analyzing war plans for conven-
tional land combat.
The nodel used new by SAGA is the Integrated Battlefield
Iterative Model (INBATIM). INBATIM is the model used in the
Tactical Force Capability Analysis (TFCA) , the major U.S.
joint analysis of conventional combat capability. INBATIM
evolved from IDAGAM and the antipctential potential approach
described here for IDAGAM is essentially the same as that
used in INEATIM. INBATIM has dropped the computation of
close ail support frcm the ground model and encorporates it
in the air portion. INBATIM aggregates weapons according to
classes. There are twelve classes starting with small arms
as class I. 5
The emphasis of this chapter is on the attrition calcu-
lations most often used in IDAGAM for ground combat. Since
IDAGAM is a theater level model, there are many submodels of
5 Infcrmation on INBATIM is taken from a conversation
with LTC. J.M. Cummings of SAGA,OJCS.
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importance to -he overall model. Air combat, logistics, and
theater ccntrol are very critical -co the running of the
model but there is nc need to discuss them in detail here as
the effects of small-arms are not directly related to them.
figure 5.1 shows the organization of the ground ccmbat
aodel used in IDAGAM. The discussion of the model will
concentrate on ccmputing losses of weapons and personnel as
these are the attrition processes where the effects of
small-arirs are imbedded. The scheme for computing attrition
is dependent on the "Method for Computing Force Ratio"
(MCFR). Although there are 13 choices for setting MCFR in
IDAGAM, the main use of the model by SAGA used MCFR 9 and
will be the one discussed here. 6 The method (MCFR=9)
involves the use of antipotential potential with value base
scaling. [Ref. 16: p.30]
The antipotential potential value of a ground weapon is
the capatility of that weapon to destroy the value (poten-
tial) or killing capability of another ground weapon. The
attriticr calculations involve determining both losses of
personnel and weapons. Both "potential" and "actual" losses
are considered. The actual number of weapons lost is
propcrticnal to the potential number of weapons lost. The
proportionality constant is based on casualties suffered by
the fcrce or upon value lost by the force.
The scheme for computing attrition is carried out as
indicated in Table IX. 7 The potential number of weapons
lost by type is a function of: total number of weapons of
that type, allocation of fire of all enemy weapons at the
weapon type, and the rate at which each of the enemy weapons
*Jor a complete coverage of the 13 methods, see refer-
ence 16.
7 Ihe scheme shown is for value based scaling, that of
using a relative 'value' of one weapon versus another.
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"* force balance , the model is determining whether ,a proper mix of
weapons exists, i.e., is it a balanced combined arms organization?
2
Sector attacker is determined by comparing the force ratio in the sector
to input values for determining attacker/defender. If no one can attack,
a holding posture exists and attrition calculations are then computed
based on neither side attacking.
rEBA smoothing here means that both attacker and defender must withdraw
if their flanks are excessive with respect to sector frontage.
Figure 5. 1 THE GBOOND COMBAT MODEL.
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kills a weapon of that type in a day. Also included are
aircraft and air munition loads and their respective rates
cf kill. This is basically a modified LanChester -type
Square Law equation. [ Ref . 16: p. 32]
TABLB IX
A1TRIT0N SCHEHE FOR VALUE BASED SCALING METHOD
1) Compute Potential Number of
Weapons Lost by Type
2) Compute Casualties Per Weapon
Lest By Type Weapcn
3) Compute Value Lost By the Force
4) Compute Actual Weapons Lost By Type
5) Ccmpute Total Casualties Which Will
Be Equal to the Sum Over All Weapon
Types cf tie Product cf Number of
Weapons Lost and the Number of
Casualties Associated With the
Less of That Weapon Type
The fractional allocation of fire is a sensitive input
to IEAGAM. Given a "standard" force composed of various
weapcn types, the allocation of fire is the percentage of
time a particular weapon "type will engage each of the
varicus weapon types of the opposing force. The allocation
may be from a judgmental Delphi technique or it could be the
result cf examining the outputs from high resolution models
to see how fires were allocated. Unfortunately, current
models for this purpose are of limited use because the
command and control functions and movement and firing are
not modelled. [Ref. 16] A rigorous mathematical treatment
cf the fire allocation scheme used in IDAGAM can be found in
reference 17.
The mathematics for this scheme is well documented, but
cne is still faced with the controversial problem of a
historical database with questionable alterations from
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judgmental sources. Regardless of the sources, one can be
sure that small-arms again play the "hidden" role of
controlling movement.
Figure 5.2 depicts the attrition computation scheme for
IDAGAM when the MCFR=S, the most widely used antipctential






^Compute force degradation factor
'based on shortage of supplies
1Compute blue ground value based on
number of blue weapons- in sector
l
Calculate blue ground value based on
personnel strength in sector
Compute blue ground effectiveness
based on weapons, personnel and supply
l





Compute percent value lost
red and blue
v
Scale potential weapons lost by value lost
based scaling factor to get actual weapons lost
v
Multiply actual number of weapons lost by respective
casualties/weapon lost to get actual casualties
figure 5.2 COMPUTATION OF WEAPON AND PERSONNEL ATTRITION.
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Ihe following sections elaborate on
Figure 5.2.
the steps found in
A. DEGRADATION FACTCB DOE TO SHORTAGE OP SUPPLIES
The number of days of supply on hand is equal t:c the
number of tons of supplies in the sector, divided by -che
number of people in the sector times the planned daily
consumption rate for the force plus a summation over all
weapon types of the number of weapons times the planned
daily supply consumption rate for the weapon. The supply
effectiveness function is basically a linear function
ranging from effectivenss for no supplies on hand , to an
effectiveness of 1.0 for 3 or more days of supplies on hand.
[Ref . 16: p. 61 ]
B. GROUND VALUE COMPUTATION IN VALUE BASED SCALING
The derived value of a weapon is proportional to the
total rate at which the weapon is destroying the value of
Value
blue weapons











— ) v— ;
__. . i
Figure 5.3 VALUE OF A IEAPON.
enemy weapons. (see figure 5.3). The kill rate of an i
shooter firing at a j target is proportional to the fire
allocation of that firer at zhat target times the input
value of the i shooter firing at the j target in a partic-
ular posture. These rates are derived from historical
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investigations of past battles, based on ammo expenditure
and number of kills with judgmental factors for how one
percieves future combat to be different from the pasx. The
proportionality is 1//J where/S is the eigenvalue of the
matrix of kill rates for each side summed over all weapon
types. The total value of the force is the summation of all
the weapons in the force of each of the weapon type's value
times the ccresponding number of weapons of that type in the
force. [Ref. 16 ] a
C. GBOQND VALUE 3ASZE OH PERSONNEL STRENGTH
The effectiveness of a force due to personnel strength
is a function of the fraction cf authorized strength present
in the force. ( FIG 5.4)
EFFECTIVENESS = f
TOTAL ACTUAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE
IN ALL DIVISIONS IN SECTOR
TOTAL AUTHORIZED (TOE) STRENGTH/
OF ALL DIVISION IN SECTOR
figure 5.4 EFFECTIVENESS DOE TO PERSONNEL.
If E* is the effectiveness described above and V* is the
total value of the force, computed as in section B above,
then the value based en personnel strength of a type-d divi-
sion on defense (attack) in a particular posture is defined
as their product. [ Bef . 16]
(Value Based On Personnel Strength) = E*V*.
8 See reference 16: p. 67 for a more complete look at the
mathematics of the eigenvalue problem.
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E. DETEBHIHATIOH OF TOTAL GBOOND VALUE
The ground value cf a division is defined as the minimum
cf the total value cf the force or of the value based on




Figure 5.5 GBOOND VALUE.
The rationale used here is to insure that there is a
talance between personnel and weapons, i.e., that the avail-
able weapons are manned by the available personnel. A man
must have a weapon to fight with as a weapon must have a man
or men tc fire it.
The total ground value is then computed as in figure
5.6. The total ground value is a sumation over all divi-
sions of the value of the division times the number of that


















Figure 5.6 TOTAL GBOUND VALUE.
The interpretation of the total ground value in the sector
is the potential value that it can destroy (MCFR=9) . it is
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a functicn of number of weapons, number of personnel and
supplies on hand as well as red side parameters. [Ref. 16:
p. 71]
E- COMPUTATIONS OF TOTAL AIR VALOE (CAS) IN SECTOR
The computations for total air value parallel those for
total ground value. Air munition types are used in place of
ground weapcn types, fractional allocation of munitions at a
specific target type, and the input value of an air munition
against a specific target type are similar to the ground
value use. 9
F. COMPUTATION OF FORCE RATIO AND FRACTIONAL VALUE LOST
The force ratio if no CAS sorties are flown is computed
as in figure 5.7 (MCJR=0).
TOTAL RED GROUND VALUE IN SECTOR
IORCE RATIO =
TOTAL BLUE GROUND VALUE IN SECTOR
Figure 5.7 FORCE RATIO.
The fractional value lost daily is a function of force
ratio and engagement posture. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illus-
trate examples for losses to the attacker and defender.
These casualty rate curves are derived from those used in
the ATLAS model (see FIG 3.4). These functions have been
refined, over time, based on judgement, to reflect a higher
intensity of combat with modern weapons systems. There is
9 £ee ref 16; P-"72 for a detailed discussion of computa-























2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
FORCE RATIO (ATTACKER/DEFENDER)
Total Red Ground Value in Sector
Total Blue Ground Value in Sector
+ Total Blue CAS Value in Sector
Figure 5.8 CASUALTY FUSCTION BED ON ATTACK.
still considerable controversy regarding the historical base
of WWII, with changes from the Middle East War, representing
future ccnflicts. The question of how to change the casu-
alty rat€ curves to represent a more intense combat environ-




PREPARED DEFEMSE OR MTMEFIEID
BREAKTHRU OR DELAY
2-0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
FORCE RATIO (ATTACKER/DEFECEER)
Red Tctal Ground Value in Sector
c^ _ * Red Total CAS Value in Sector
Blue Total Ground Value in Sector
Figure 5.9 CASUALTY FUNCTION BLUE ON DEFENSE.
G. SCALING, COM POTATION OF CASUALTIES AND BEAPON LOSSES
When MCFR=9, the fractional value lost is multiplied by
the total ground value and divided by the the potential
value lost to form the scaling ratio. The scaling ratio is
then multiplied ty the potential number of weapons lest of
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€ach type tc the actual number of weapons lost of each type
in a sector:
ACTUS! NUMEER
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IB the value based scaling method, the total number of
casualties is computed after the actual number of weapcns
losz. is computed. The total number of casualties in a
sector is taken to be the product of the actual number of
weapons lost of each type and the corresponding number of
casualties associated with the loss of each weapon type.

















Figure 5.10 ACTUAL BOMBER OF CASOAITIES.
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CThe input for the number of casualties associated with
each weapon loss is a critical value and again controversial
with historical data and judgement on increased intensity of
modern combat.
IEAGflM has problems similar to those of the detailed
models of the earlier chapters in the representatcr. o
small-arms effects. IDAGAM has nice mathematical relations
set up to handle the modelling of combat with all sorts of
submodels, but it still relies on a casualty function that
is historical in nature with changes as perceived by the
model builder. It is not the intention of this thesis to
degrade a historical base of these models. It is important
that models be validated and history is the best way of
doing that right now. It must be remembered, however, that
small-arms played a tig role in the past historical battle
and will play a large role in the next actual battle. One





Chapter II and appendix A pcint out that small-arms have
certain well defined missions and perform certain functions
vital to successful ccmbined arms combat. An examination of
chapters IV and V reveals that the important functions for
small-arms of security, personnel safety, terrain denial,
breaking up opposing forces, and preventing dismounted
infantry frcm clearing obstacles are not explicitly repre-
sented in IDAGAM or ether current models. The complexities
of low-level ccmbat are so great that current models
designed for theater-level combat must aggregate forces so a
more manageable level of ccmbat is achieved. The assump-
tions used to aggregate the individual weapons are the very
ones that contain the value of small-arms.
The quantized values given to tanks or artillery in an
aggregated model are all based on assumptions that adequate
security is provided by small arms. Movement rates given
for attacker/defender postures in different terrain all
assume small-arms helping or hindering the movement. The
probabilities of kill for tank and antitank systems all are
based on experience in which small-arms play a vital role in
preventing access to terrain and channelizing the opposing
force. The values given to larger weapons systems are not
totally a representation of a single large weapon, but are a
representation of that single large weapon supported by a
complement of small-arms.
All models need to be validated by some means. There
has to be some standard against which to check a model to
insure that it generates results that are reasonable and as
real to life as possible. In the case of combat models, the
validation takes place through historical analysis of past
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battles, with judgemental factors for how one perceives past
warfare to be different from the present or future.
The basis for determining such things in the models as
relative values of weapons systems, movement ratas and
overall attrition factors, is based on historical interpre-
tations. All of these historical and judgmental interpreta-
tions have and had small arms present. There is no data
base, historical or otherwise, on which to base a 'battle'
with no small arms. This of course would be ludicrous but
is essentially the guestion one is asking whan trying to
define the value of small-arms in a combined-arms scenario.
CCL. Tevor N. Dupuy is known for his historical studies
that define attrition rates such as those used in the ATIAS
model and further refined for IDAGAM. COL. Dupuy has devel-
oped tables of Combat Multipliers for various parameters of
battle such as weather, terrain, surprise, and others for
use in his Quantified Judgement Model. A table on defense
terrain multipliers defines values ranging from 1.05 for
flat-bare, hard ground to 1.55 for rugged-semiwooded ground.
[Ref. 18]
A logical extension to COL. Dupuy' s work, tying in with
cbservations from the National Training Center, would be to
define the value of small arms as multipliers from the
standpoint of making terrain more impassible through the
protection cf obstacles and channelizing of infantry. For
example, if a piece of terrain had a value of 1.3 for a
hasty defense, it might be 1.4 for a defense that placed out
good obsacles and pcssibly 1.5 or 1.6 if those obstacles
were protected from both reconnaisance and clearing by





The total contribution cf small-arms to modern combat is
not currently represented explicitly in existing
aggr egated-for ce models. The various effects of small-arms
discussed in this thesis simply are not considered. At best,
they are implicit in the casualty-assesment routines of
aggregated force models. In othsr words the historical
development of attrition rates and movement rates of current
models all have unstated but assumed small-arms support.
Synergism, the actions or threat of one weapons system
cr systems causing another weapons system to achieve a kill,
is what makes the ccmbined arms team a force with a value
greater than the sum cf its parts. Unfortunately, empiracal
data to give definition to synergism at the heart of the
tattle is difficult tc obtain.
Small-arms are every bit as vital to a successful battle
today as they were in the Civil War. New weapons sytems and
tactics have forced seme evolution on the use of small-arms
and the small-arms themselves are evolving to meet the chal-
lange of a technically advanced adversary. With the threat
and friendly weapons systems advancing at a rapid rate, it
would be a disastrously easy mistake to let small-arms
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1. Reference FONECON between you and LTC Crowley about MG/rifle data from
National Training Center (NTC). We do not have analytic data on use of these
weapons systems suitable to support your project.
2. Problems with collecting such MG/rifle data are:
a. Lack of links between all dismounted soldiers and the computer.
b. Smaller numbers of OPFOR infantry than would be available in a Soviet
formation.
3. In spite of these limitations, Infantry is critical to the conduct of
mobile operations in the desert. An enclosed staffed article points out
roles of infantry in the defense. In the offense, a dismounted infantry
capability is required to:
a. Clear danger areas and obstacles.
b. Attack OPFOR positions too well defended to be assaulted by mounted
forces.
c. Conduct dismounted operations under limited visibility conditiogF. "ZZ
xl . , » 1
4. Operations at the NTC continue to prove the absolute requirement totrave " TH
well-trained dismounted soldiers available to work as members of the combined >""")
arms team in any normal tactical mission. IV* r::







ENCLOSURE FROM ABCVE LETTER
This issue of Training Notes will present tactics and
techniques that have proven to be effective for defending a
single ccmpany battle position. We will highlight and
expand on what worked at the NIC.
MAJOB LESSONS
Units training at the NTC quickly learn four major
lessens about conducting defensive operations. Speed of
CPFOB advance: OPFOR technique, like those of the Soviets,
do not emphasize terrain driving or bounding overwatch.
Instead, techniques consistently used are rapid movement to
an assault line, deployment, and then assault. This means
the CPFCR moves considerably faster than units using
American tactics. Therefore, defending units must act, mass
fires and shoot quickly. There isn't a lot of time for
decisionmaking or maneuver; the battle can be won or lost in
the first 30 minutes from the time the OPFOR main attack
begins. Effective use of obstacles is critical and can
allow the commander time to reposition forces so that the
CPFOB is defeated.
Obscuratio n cf the battlefield Obscuration is the normal
condition fcr an attack. The OPFOR normally tries to place
smoke en or near the Blue positions and units to hide his
movements. Additionally, desert dust conditions, obscura-
tion caused by impacting indirect fires, and use of on board
smoke generators cause OPFOR trailing vehicles within forma-
tions to be hidden frcm view.
Initially, units select weapon positions, sectors of
fire and obstacle locations for full visibility conditions.
Successful units realize that defensive positions must be
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set up tc work both in full and limited visibility with
ninimal adjustments. They start to position weapons and
obstacles to meet both conditions. This means weapons are
placed closer to enemy avenues of approach, or where they
can quickly move to limited visibity positions; obstacles
are sited closer to weapons, flanking fires are emphasized,
and more weapons are initially allocated to cover approaches
the CEFOE may use under limited visibility conditions. The
key pcint en identifying limited visibility approaches is
that wher an enemy attacks during limited visibility, he
must attack along an axis which simplifies navigation,
command, and control.
Limited visibility as a normal condition probably
applies to any future battlefield.
Skillful positioning of weapons; AT weapons must be
carefully sited to provide cover, mutual support, disper-
sion, flanking fires, and to allow movement. Obvious
terrain jrust be avoided. Every favorable fold of all other
ground must be used . Use of dug-in or hide positions may be
required. Units toe often tend to go to high ground even
when it does not provide good weapons positions, or covered
movement routes.
Weapcn positions should always be checked from the
enemy*s side prior to the battle to ensure proper cover,
concealment and siting. If the situation permits, a vehicle
traversing likely enemy avenues of approach can assist in
determining exposure. This is especially important for TOWs
and Dragcns. From this check, weapons are repositioned as
necessary.
£HOB use of recce: OPFOB attacks typically begin with
a nighttime reconnaissance effort to find obstacles and
battle positions, and to gather information on the Blue
forces. During this phase, obstacles are either breached or
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bypass routes found and marked. Units quickly learn that
this reconnaissance effort must be stopped and that obsta-
cles must te guarded to prevent neutralization. They should
be checked at first light to ensure breaches haven't been
made. local security, movement of direct fire weapons to
cover obstacles at night, and readiness of a reaction force
to destroy enemy recon elemnts that penetrate the scout
screen are key to defeating an anemy attack. Be ready.
USE OF MECHANIZED INFANTRY
Seme of the most important lessons that come cut of NTC
operations are on the effective use of infantry. Here are
some
:
Infantry battle ccsitiors: Mech platoons do net defend
battle pesitions using the mounted technique nor do they
fire the Dragon from the APC. Units have found that both of
these tactics found in FMs 7-7, 71-1 and 71-2 are ineffec-
tive; they cause APCs to be destroyed. When firing the
Dragcn or performing some other task that requires quick
movement, infantry leaders stop the APC in full defilade,
dismount the part of the squad needed and turn the APC
around fcr guick exit. This technique allows quicker move-
ment, is harder for the OPFOR to detect, and results in less
exposure of the APC.
When defending a battle position, experience has
confirmed the need to quickly and completely dig in.
Fighting positions must have overhead cover. Placing
dismounted infantry in naturally restrictive terrain such as
wadis or steep hills makes this process quicker and easier.
Use cf carriers: Bradleys haven 1 t been used at the NTC
yet. aith the M113, units seldom position carrier teams
with the dismounted elements as they found that the APCs are
difficult tc hide and give away the dismounted platoon posi-
tions. Rather, APCs are normally kept in hide positions and
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Iragons are placed with tha dismounted elements.
Unfortunately, carrier teams are not used in a support by
fire rol€. However this must be considered a MILES training
problem. The M-2, 50 caliber machinegun can penetrate BMPs
at close range and provide excellent suppressive effects
against light skinned vehicles and personnel. The full use
of carriers is not only valid but vital to get maximum fires
en the enemy.
Mechani zed Infantry platocn missions: Even in the rela-
tively open Armor type desert terrain, infantry has proven
to be a full fledged partner in the combined arms team.
Good uses of infantry include:
-Providing security. OPs , ambushes, and patrols are
positioned to detect and defeat OPFOR recon elements and to
give early earning of CPFOR mounted or dismounted attacks.
-Euildirg and protecting obstacles. Contruction of
obstacles tc slow down the OPFOR has proven to be a critical
function. One engineer platoon per battalion is not enough
in the normal time available. Infantry can and must help.
Infantry must also be used to guard obstacles and is
normally used to clcse lanes or gaps in obstacles. They
must be fully prepared. Bhen gaps/lanes must be closed,
there isn't much time. The infantry element given this
mission must be provided with demolitions (such as shape
charges) or mines to close the gap or lane, unless the
company or battalion plans to use FA-delivered scatterable
lines. They must have a primary and at least one alternate
means cf cemmunica tiens with the company team to make sure
the obstacle is clcsed quickly once the order is given.
This element may stay behind to protect the obstacle from
enemy recon/breaching efforts after the lane/gap is closed.
-Blocking enemy dismounted and mounted approaches. If
AT fires can stop the CPFOR advance, the OPFOR will conduct
a dismounted attack to destroy these weapons--normally
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moving through wadis or other rugged terrain. When
availble, artillery or mortar FPFs should be planned on
dismounted approaches and infantry positioned to block them.
Dismounted infantry can also block mounted attacks. They
can do -his by being positioned in tank restricted terrain
and placing Dragon and LAW fire on a high speed approach
from the flank, or by blocking an enemy movement across
trafficatle terrain from well dug in positions protected by
obstacles.
CTHEE LESSONS LESFNED BY USING INFANTRY.
E2i£§ is restricted tsrrai r Dismounted infantry must be
placed in favorable positions. They should be on ground
where they cannot be cverrun by a mounted assault. Wadis,
steep hills, protective minefields, or antitank ditches
provide good protection.
£on',t expose to long range fires and ob serva tions: As a
general rule, a dismounted positon should not expose the
infartryman at a range where he cannot effectively engage
the enemy. While maximum range of the Dragon is 1000
meters, it should be positioned to fire at the flanks of
armored vehicles, and so actual engagement ranges are less.
The platcon should net be able to shoot (or be shot at) from
more than this expected engagement range. Observation of
greater ranges should be made by OPs located away from the
tattle position. Reverse slope positioning is often used,
unless well covered positions, such as wadis, are available
on the feward slopes.
1J:J£1I§ for disengagement: When dismounted infantry is
engaged, it is decisively engaged. The short range of
infantry weapons means that when they shoot at any major
CPFOR mounted attack, they cannot disengage unless the OPFOR
has teen stopped by massed fires and/or obstacles and
covered routes of withdrawal are available; or unless the
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attacking CfFOR has been destroyed or pushed oack. If the
task force commander's plan is to disengage the infantry,
the decision must be mads early. If the foward position is
not intended to be held, it has proven to be effective to
send discounted elements back to occupy and prepare subse-
quent positions while carrier teams with Dragons are used on
the initial position.
££Zil£ dis mounted infantry with AT fire: The most
dramatic examples of effective use of dismounted infantry
have teen in cases where the dug in infantry elements were
attacking the OPFOR flanks and rear with close in fire while
he was being engaged by TOWs and tank.s in over watch posi-
tions. This caused the OEFOB to fight in two directions.
When this happened, the OPFOR was completely defeated and
the dismounted infantry was extracted by the carrier teams
after the battle.
CSE CF ICfcS/TANKS
Eefensive "battles" at the NTC are won or lost by effec-
tive use of AT firepower. Maximum use of the mobility of
these systems is critical. These weapons must be maneuvered
to place effective fires on the enemy and to avoid enemy
suppression. Here are some of the techniques used.
Disperse AT weapons: Initially, units tend to bunch up
en dominant terrain. This makes command and control easier
but makes ycu more vulnerable to preparatory fires; espe-
cially if the position occupied is obvious or if it has been
located by OPFCfi recon. It also maices it easier for
attacking OPFOR tanks and ATGMs to spot and engage defending
vehicles.
2§e alt ern ate po sitons: Alternate positions are neces-
sary to allow TOWs or tanks to continue engagement if the
enemy pinpoints the initial position. The need for
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alternate positions increases as engagement ranges decrease.
In view of the normally rapid OPFOR advance, altsrnat3 posi-
tions must be close enough for quick movement, but out of
the enemy weapon sight picture (50-75 meters). If there has
not teen time to locate or prepare alternate postions, as a
last resort, the vehicle should at least pull out of the
position after firing three cr four rounds and then recccupy
it. Ihis breaks up the enemy's sight picture.
Use sup ple mentary pos itions: Supplementary positions
are ones which allow weapon fire into a different area. To
mass fires en the enemy, each company will normally be given
one or mere on order sectors of fire, engagement areas, or
larget Reference Points (TRPs) . Likewise the team commander
normally assigns on order sectors of fire to his platoons.
As in choosing alternate positions, rapid movement between
primary and supplementary positions must be possible.
lIS£iIi £.§£011 and reh ear se routes be tween posit ions :
Experience has shown that most losses take place during
movement, so routes cut of and between positions must have
cover and concealment. If covered routes aren't available
then use of smoke can provide some protection. Because the
CPFOB puts suppressive fires on positions, vehicles normally
must defend and move buttoned up and in MOPP 4. Crews must
actually rehearse movements the same way. Here also the
unit should conduct rehearsals while someone is watching
from the enemy's side to see if vehicles are exposed. If
they are, pesitons or routes should be changed.
S^e of fla nk and rear s hot s: Flanks or rear engagements
have proven far better than frontal ones. The OPFOR
doctrine of a rapid advance makes it vulnerable to flank
shots. A moving tank crew is generally oriented in its
direction of movement. It can detect and engage a weapon to
its front far easier than one to its flank or rear. Also
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its heaviest protection is on the frontal area. Units that
have placed AT positions to engage the flank or rear of
enemy formations have had some spectacular successes. There
have been cases of a single tank destroying a whole OPFOR
company!
Decide on disengage ment s early: In favorable terrain,
CPFOR formations advance rapidly. Normal rate of movement
is 300-400 meters per minute. If the team commander decides
to move his unit, he must make that decison early enough
to reguest permission from the battalion commander, get the
word down through his chain of command, and get overwatch
elements into positicn and indirect fires on the ground to
cover the move. Rehearsal of moves are needed to find the
actual times it will take to make the move. It helps to
establish a measured "trigger line" on the ground or event
(e.g., "When Team B gets tc BP 34") to use a key to begin
disengagement actions.
fire c ont rol: Units are not initially using TRPs,
engagement areas, near half/far half and other fire control
technigues. This appears to be due to a limited use of
MILES and/or limited experience at trying tc defeat a large,
rapidly advancing OPFOR during pre-NTC training. At Ft
Irwin, units find that fire control is essential. Fires
must be massed into the area where the enemy is advancing.
At the same time these fires must be distributed across the
enemy formation to avoid multiple firings at the same
target. Units have found they must determine actual
distances tc the TRPs. This can be done by placing or using
some object to serve as a range marker and by using a tank's
cr FIST's range finder. Knowing actual distance helps fire
control and precludes firing at OPFOR vehicles out of range.
Dnits also have found that marking Target Reference Points
(TRPs) ty chemical lights, with shielding to prevent them
from being seen from the enemy's side, helps at night.
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The us€ of the firs control techniques and the fire
ccnticl matrix found in FM 71-1, pages 4-36 to 4-39, coupled
with proper weapons positioning and designation of sectors
cf fire all are workable and necessary. Unfortunately, most
units are untrained in these techniques. Although fire
contrcl and skill at weapons positioning are difficult tasks
to master, units seldom fully develop this proficiency at
the NIC. Good shooting, frequent boresighting of the MILES
transmitter and contrcl of fires is essential.
ISI^crm earl^y reconnaissance: Occupation and full prep-
aration of a battle position, with careful siting of
weapons, siting protective obstacles, establishing hot loops
and all the other tasks that go into the development of a
battle position, require many manhours. The company
commander, platoon leaders and FIST chief must reccn the
battle pcstion and to select the position of weapons and
obstacles. Selection of positions is easier if a tank and
TOW vehicle are brought along. This can be done while the
XO and NCO chain of command finish preparation and movement.
When the company team main body arrives, it can be kept in a
hide pcsiticn to refuel, camouflage and have maintenance
performed while leaders check positions. This technique can
prevent unnecessary vehicle movement on the position.
Establish and enforce work priorities: Untrained units
waste toe much time getting started. The suggested work
priorities found in FM 71-1, page 4-40, are good although
they sometimes require modification. The important thing is
that units have a practiced SOP for accomplishing all the
tasks needed to defend a battle position. Selecting weapons
positions, establishing sectors, laying hot loops, emplacing
hasty protective minefields, preparing range cards, and




Check p csitions at night: At night send a leader fcward
with a passive sight to check light dicipline from the
enemy's side.
Counterattack preparation: Rapid movement of tanks to
engage an enemy formation from the flank works. . To do it
you must plan and prepare. Select the positions that might
he used and routes tc them. Have the platoons rehearse.
Secure the route and positions with OPs so that the counter-
attacking force can move rapidly into position without the
fear of running into an enemy force.
SUMMARY
This article has identified some of the techniques which
leaders found effective in defending against the OPFOR at
the NTC. The OPFOR is a demanding foe. He makes you pay
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